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Market Structure and Consumer Valuation in the 
rBST-free and Organic Milk Markets 
 
The U.S. food sector is going through rapid transformations in terms of new 
product introduction and innovations.  Organic and genetically modified food products 
are leading the way in changing the landscape of available choices to consumers.   This 
rapid expansion of product spaces has taken place concomitantly with an increase in 
public policy concerns on issues of standardization, labeling, health risks and associated 
consumer welfare.  In this paper we explore these broader issues in the context of a 
specific product introduction, the introduction of rBST-free and organic milk in the U.S. 
market.  From a policy perspective understanding the market for organics and the various 
components of that demand (i.e., what portion is for GMO free and what is for other 
attributes of organics) can help determine the value of creating a national standard and 
the potential welfare losses to consumers of weakening such a standard.  Are consumers 
willing to pay extra for organic and rBST-free milk?  If so, how much are they willing to 
pay?  What is the value or cost of a national labeling policy? 
Labeling of genetically modified food products first became an issue for 
consumers in the U.S. with the introduction of rBST (recombinant bovine somatotropin) 
into the milk supply in 1994.  A number of states, including Wisconsin and Vermont, 
passed laws allowing processors to label their milk as being rBST-free.
4  As the first 
widely consumed food product produced with genetic modification technology, rBST has 
garnered a lot of interest in its adoption process (see e.g., Foltz and Chang, Barham et al.) 
but relatively little research has been done on the consumer side.  In addition to labels 
specifically on rBST-free milk, there is an increasingly large market for organic milk and 
milk products. Since organic labeled foods not only do not contain genetically modified 
products but also have other potentially desirable attributes such as being pesticide and 
antibiotic free, the differences between rBST-free milk and organic milk can identify 
some of the different values consumers place on product attributes.   
                                                 
4 Milk that comes from cows treated with recombinant bovine somatotropin is not genetically modified it is 
the hormone somatotropin that has been genetically engineered.  No studies have shown milk from cows 
treated with rBST to have somatotropin in it that is recognizable as being genetically engineered.  
However, most labeling of rBST-free milk implies that such would be the case.   3
Since the possibility of genetically modified foods entering the market became 
apparent in the early 1990’s, a large literature has developed investigating consumer 
valuations for non-genetically modified foods as well as labels about genetic 
modifications (see e.g., Armand-Balmat, Teisel et al., Huffman et al.).  This literature has 
been based primarily on consumer willingness to pay surveys (by telephone or mail) and 
experiments conducted with potential consumers of products.  Both of these techniques 
rely on the accuracy of consumers either reached by telephone at home or invited to an 
artificial laboratory setting to predict their behavior when faced with different products in 
the supermarket.  In addition, due mostly to cost and logistics, many of these efforts are 
local, often concerning only one or two cities or a single state.   
The present study uses revealed preferences of consumers to study the consumer 
valuations of rBST-free and organic milk, basing its analysis on IRI scanner data of fluid 
milk purchases in 12 key US metropolitan markets.
5  Of the 12 cities, 4 are in the West 
census region, 4 in the South census region, 3 in the Midwest, and 1 in the Northeast 
region.  Due to disclosure agreements with IRI we cannot mention the cities or brands 
included in our analysis.  Instead these cities are identified by US census regions as: West 
census region cities (WT_1,.., WT_4); South census region cities (SO_1,.., SO_4); 
Midwest region cities (MW_1,.., MW_3); and Northeast region city (NE_1). The 
database provides detailed brand level information on volume sold, total revenue 
generated, number of units sold, and the extent of merchandising and price reduction.  
This data allows a simultaneous exploration of consumer willingness to pay, market 
structure, and the conduct of firms in these markets.  As a result we are able to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the U.S. retail fluid milk market by types (i.e., organic, rBST 
and unlabeled milk).   
The revealed preference data used here have a number of obvious advantages over 
the previous survey and experimental based literature.  First and foremost it relies on 
consumer’s actual behavior rather than their predicted behavior.  Second data is available 
for 12 major metropolitan cities spanning U.S. regions and the different types of cities: 
old industrial city, mainstream fast-growing city, counterculture fast-growing city, old 
                                                 
5 Due to disclosure agreements with IRI we cannot mention the cities or brands included in our analysis.  
So we will specify cities as City 1 to City 12 and mention their broad geographic location.   4
line blue-blood city, etc.  Thus one can make some reasonable inferences about the 
population as a whole from this data.  A third advantage is we observe consumer 
responses both at the time they are introduced to a product and their subsequent purchase 
pattern once they are used to the product in the market.  Having this time series avoids 
potential biases inherent in the experimental and survey literature when consumers are 
faced with a product they have never seen or tasted before.  A final advantage is that 
rBST-free, organic, and unlabeled milk are all real products that consumers consider 
buying each time they go to the grocery store. 
The goals of this paper are to: 
-  Identify empirically the extent of market penetration of GMO-free milk products. 
-  Estimate price premiums and market shares of different milk types in each of the 
12 markets and estimate Engle curves for the milk types. 
-  Analyze the level and determinants of consumer valuation for the different types of 
milk using a highly flexible quadratic almost ideal demand system (Q-AIDS) 
framework as in Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997).  We use full information 
maximum likelihood estimation techniques to estimate the demand systems for 
four regionally and geographically representative markets after controlling for 
price and expenditure endogeneity as in Dhar, Chavas and Gould (2002).   
-  Based on the estimates of our models we measure compensating variations 
attributable to rBST-free and organic milk, as a measure of willingness to pay for 
GMO-free products. 
The article is organized as follows.  First, we describe the data and present 
descriptive analysis of the products: rBST-free, organic and unlabeled and the 12 
markets. The reduced form analysis of this section provides insights and guidelines for 
the structural demand analysis in the section that follows.  In Section 2 we provide a 
detailed demand system specification and our estimation methods to generate consistent 
parameter estimates.  In Section 3, we present our empirical specification of the demand, 
price and expenditure systems.  Econometric results and post estimation measures such as 
price and expenditure elasticities, and welfare impacts of different types of milk are then 
presented in Section 4.  A conclusion drawing policy implication for USDA labeling and 
regulation policy follows.   5
 
 
1. Data and Descriptive Statistics: 
We use retail scanner data from Information Resources Inc. to conduct 
exploratory market analysis and estimate our demand system.  Our scanner database, 
which was collected so as to be representative of the markets in our 12 cities, provides 
brand level milk prices and sales each week starting from 3/9/1997 to the week ending 
2/24/2002.  Brands that are labeled as rBST-free or organic were identified through 
interviews with processors and retailers. We augment this database with milk price data 
from the Federal Milk Marketing Order and a national organic milk producer.  The 
demographic variables come from the U.S. Census.  The descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in our analysis are described below.  
  The simplest method for understanding premiums for rBST-free and organic milk 
is an investigation of retail price differentials.  Tables 1 and 2 present the average prices 
for the three milk types in our study by city of sale and by year, respectively.  On 
average, price differences between organic and unlabeled milk are about $3.00 per gallon 
and between rBST-free and unlabeled about $1.50 per gallon.  This represents more than 
a 100% mark-up for organic milk and 50% for rBST-free milk.  A number of significant 
differences between milk types and cities, however, become immediately apparent.  A 
western city, WT_4, has the lowest prices for both organic and rBST-free milk, although 
its price for unlabeled milk is above average.  In one of the southern cities, SO_3, and a 
Midwestern city, MW_2, rBST-free milk is priced at about the same high level as organic 
milk.   
Over the 5 years from 1997 to 2002 prices increased by 24% in organic, 25% in 
rBST-free, and 13% in unlabeled milk.  This asymmetric pattern of price inflation pushed 
the price differential between organic and unlabeled from $2.68 to $3.64 per gallon 
(123% of the unlabeled price) and between rBST-free and unlabeled from $1.42 to $2.10 
per gallon (70% of the unlabeled price).   
  Such price differentials show significant willingness-to-pay among certain 
consumers for the attributes of organic and rBST-free milk.  In particular since organic 
milk represents rBST-free milk with added attributes (e.g., no antibiotics, organic feed   6
given to the cows, and potentially the idea of small-farm production) one can identify the 
value to consumers of these different components.  Thus on average over this period, 
avoiding milk from cows treated with a genetically modified hormone was worth $1.50 
per gallon, while drinking milk from cows which also received no antibiotics, were fed 
organic feeds with no-pesticides, and are advertised as coming from small dairy farms 
was worth an additional $1.50 per gallon.  These averages, however, ignore market 
effects and different demand surface curvatures, which are analyzed in the next section. 
  Tables 1 and 2 also show market shares by type of milk by city and by year.  
While unlabeled milk clearly has nearly all the market, ranging from a low of 96% in 
WT_4 to a high of 99.86% in WT_3, rbst-free and organic milks are making some small 
in-roads.  There is great variability by city, for example in WT_4 1% of the dollar sales 
of milk are organic and 2.7% are rBST-free, while MW_3 has no rBST-free sales and a 
paltry quarter of a percentage of its milk sales being organic.   
The yearly share data in Table 1 identify two key features: the organic market is 
growing rapidly, while the rBST-free market seems to have peaked in 1998 and is in 
decline.  Organic market shares increased nearly seven fold over the same period.  Figure 
1 shows that growth in four key markets.  That spectacular growth rate in organic market 
shares does show signs of slowing since it was 94% between 1997 and 1998 had slowed 
to 16% between 2001 and 2002.  Even so, in the end organic still accounts for less than 
1% of the milk market.   
In contrast, rBST-free milk has a declining market share, suggesting two possible 
scenarios.  It may be that as consumers learn more about rBST over time their 
perceptions of the risks associated with the technology go down reducing their desire to 
buy rBST-free milk.  Some studies (see e.g., Tegene et al.) have suggested that 
information plays a major role in consumer willingness to pay for goods without 
genetically modified ingredients.  Another possibility comes from the literature on 
product differentiation.
6  From the consumer’s perspective these milk products may be 
vertically differentiated such that given the same price organic milk is preferred to rBST-
free milk and rBST-free milk is preferred to unlabeled milk.  In this case rBST-free milk 
might be a “starter” or “gateway” milk for those who would like to buy organic but 
                                                 
6 For detailed discussion on the concept of product differentiation please refer to Tirole (1981).   7
cannot afford it.  Or, a third related possibility is that consumers move up the “quality 
ladder” from unlabeled to rBST-free to organic in an incremental process driven by 
learning about the products.  In such a scenario rBST-free consumers move to organic 
because the learning that takes place in purchasing rBST-free milk and reading the labels 
at the breakfast table makes consumers more likely to purchase organic milk.  All of 
these conjectures would require further study, probably using different types of data 
To complete the description of the data we present Engle curves for the three 
types of milk in Figures 2, 3, and 4.  These curves show dollar expenditures of each milk 
type as a function of total expenditure on milk for a single milk market, WT_4.  The 
Engle curves were estimated non-parametrically using the Lowess smoothing technique 
in order to allow for non-linearities in the curves.  The curves show significant 
differences as well as major non-linear portions.  Both the organic and unlabeled milk 
Engle curves are mostly increasing with respect to the total milk expenditures. Although 
organic milk has a concave Engel curve, unlabeled milk has a linear Engel curve.  RBST-
free milk shares, in contrast, are declining and convex to the origin suggesting that as 
milk expenditures increase consumers switch out of rBST-free milk.  This expenditure 
declining with total expenditures for rBST-free milk provides some evidence for the 
quality ladders hypothesis, that as expenditures rise consumers are switching out of 




2. A Consumer Demand System for Multiple Milk Types 
In this section we first describe our choice of demand system. Then we derive the 
analytical form of the post estimation measures: elasticities and welfare effects.     
 
a.  Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System: 
To specify demand for different types of milk we use the quadratic almost ideal 
demand system (Q-AIDS).  Our non-parametric analysis of Engel curves suggests that 
the relationship between per capita expenditure on any milk type and total per capita 
expenditure on milk is non-linear.  Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997) have shown that   8
in the presence of such non-linear Engel curves use of a rank 2 demand system such as 
the standard AIDS model is inappropriate.  The Q-AIDS is the best available exactly 
aggregable demand system to capture any non-linear impacts of price and expenditure 
changes on demand.  The demand system underlying the Q-AIDS is of rank 3, which, as 
proved in Gorman (1981), is the maximum possible rank for any demand system that is 
linear in functions of income.  Unlike the AIDS model (Deaton and Muelbauer, 1981) 
and the exactly aggregable Translog model of Jorgenson et al. (1982) the Q-AIDS model 
permits goods to be luxuries at some income level and necessities at others.     
In order to derive a Q-AIDS demand system let e(p, u) be the household 
expenditure function, where 
n R p + + ∈  is the (n×1) price vector of the (n×1) vector of 
consumption goods 
n R q + ∈ .  Under the almost ideal class of demand systems, 
[]
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M , the parameters (α, β, τ, Γ) satisfy the restrictions:  
α
T 1n = 1, β
T1n = 0, τ
T 1n = 0, Γ 1n = 0n (homogeneity/adding up), and Γ
T = Γ (symmetry). 
Letting M> 0 be household expenditure, the Marshallian demand specification in terms of 
expenditures shares w ≡ (p1 q1
*/x, …, pn qn
*/x)
T are 
(1)  w= α + Γ ln p + β [ln x – ln a(p)] + τ [ln x – ln a(p)]
2/c(p).    
In order to facilitate the empirical implementation one can also specify this 
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where p = (p1, …, pN)’ is a (N×1) vector of prices for q, and wilt = (pilt xilt/Mlt) is the 
budget share for the i
th commodity consumed in the l
th city at time t.  The term P, the 
price index can be expressed as:  
ln(Plt) = δ + ∑ =
N
1 m αm ln(pmlt) + 0.5 ∑ =
N
1 m ∑ =
N
1 j γmj ln(pmlt) ln(pjlt).   9
The above Q-AIDS specification (equation 2) can be modified to incorporate the 
effects of socio-demographic variables (Z1lt, …, ZKlt) on consumption behavior, where Zklt 
is the k
th socio-demographic variable in the l
th city at time t, k = 1, …, K.  This method, 
demographic translating, allows demographic differences to shift both the intercept and 
elasticity parameters.  Under demographic translating, αi is assumed to take the following 
form: αilt = α0i+ ∑ =
K
1 k λik Zklt, i = 1, …, N.  
 
b.  Using Q-AIDS to analyze substitution between milk types: 
From estimating a Q-AIDS model, one can recover detailed compensated and un-
compensated own and cross price elasticities, expenditure elasticities, and measures of 
consumer welfare.  The own and cross price elasticities allow us to analyze the 
substitution behavior of consumers between the different types of milk as a way of 
describing consumer demand for labeled milk.  In addition, the literature suggests that 
labeled milk should be a luxury good, a proposition which can be analyzed with the 
expenditure elasticity.  Together these elasticities describe the patterns of consumer 
willingness to pay for labeled milk. 
Differentiating the demand system (equation 1) with respect to lnp and lnM gives 





































































γ α µ γ µ .  Then the 






.  The uncompensated price elasticities 






− = where  ij δ  is the Kronecker delta.  We use the Slutsky equation 
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c.  Using Q-AIDS to Measure Benefits from Labeled Milk: 
Since rBST-free and organic milks were just being introduced to the general milk 
market during this data’s study period, one can think of measuring consumer valuation of   10
labeled milk as measuring the benefits of a new product introduction.  New products have 
two effects: on the one hand they raise competition, potentially lowering prices of all 
related goods; on the other they provide increased choice to consumers which according 
to standard consumer theory should have a non-negative effect on consumer utility.  
Since we observe markets both with and without each of the labeled milk varieties we 
can use this variation in the data along with the Q-AIDS model to identify key 
components of consumer benefits from the product.     
The standard approach in the literature on product introductions (see e.g., Hausman 
(1981) and Hausman and Leonard (2002)) measures the total effect on consumers from 
the introduction of new products as the difference in the consumers’ expenditure function 
before and after the introduction, i.e., the compensating variation, CV.  Holding utility 
constant at the post-introduction level, compensating variation can be described as: 
(3)  () ( ) ( ) 1 0 1 1 1 , , , , , , u r p p p e u r p p e CV N N
∗ − = ,        
where p1 is the vector of post-introduction prices of the competing products, pN is the 
post-introduction price of the new product(s), p0 is the pre introduction prices, r is a price 
vector for products outside the industry, and u1 is the post-introduction utility level.  The 
function pN
*(p) defines the ‘virtual’ price for the new products, which is the reservation 
price at which demand for the new product would be zero given the prices of the other 
products.   
This total benefit to consumers can be decomposed into two components: 
(4a)  () ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) () ( ) [ ] ( ) 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , , , , , , , , , , , , u r p p p e u r p p p e u r p p p e u r p p e CV N N N N
∗ ∗ ∗ − + − = ,   
which can be re-written as:  
(4b)  ) ( CE VE CV + − = .  
Here the first term (VE) represents a variety effect, implying the change in consumer 
welfare due to the availability of the new products(s), holding the prices of the existing 
brands constant at the pre-introduction level.  The second term is the competitive effect 
(CE), which represents the consumer welfare due to the change in the prices of existing 
brands after the introduction.  The impact of the competitive effect can be positive or 
negative based on the nature of competition between firms producing the products 
originally on the market and those that have entered the market.     11
The variety effect can be estimated indirectly out of the parameters of the Q-AIDS 
demand system as the area under the estimated demand curve between actual 
price/consumption points and the price that sets consumption equal to zero.  The 
competitive effect can be estimated directly from the milk price series before and after 
introduction of a labeled milk variety.
7  The empirical techniques for estimating these 
effects are described below. 
 
 
3. Estimation Procedures for the Demand System 
  A number of previous studies have found problems of endogeneity of price and 
expenditure in estimating demand systems using aggregate scanner data such as those 
used in this study (see e.g., Dhar, Chavas and Gould, 2003).  In order to account for 
potential price and expenditure endogeneity, our estimation procedure for the Q-AIDS 
demand system, equation (2), includes an additional set of equations that simultaneously 
estimate the determinants of milk prices and milk expenditures as functions of strictly 
exogenous variables.
8  We estimate our demand equations, reduced form price equations, 
and expenditure equation using a full information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
estimation method.  Due to adding up restrictions of the Q-AIDS demand system we drop 
one demand equation and estimate a system with 2 demand equations, 3 reduced form 
price equations, and 1 expenditure equation.     
The reduced form price equations used to control for price endogeneity for each 
milk type (unlabeled, rBST-free, and organic) are specified to capture the supply side of 
the price formation mechanism.  The price equation for the i
th commodity in the l
th city at 
time t is:  
(5) p ilt = f(supply/demand shifters). 
In equation (5) supply/demand shifters would include variables to describe raw material, 
product manufacturing, and packaging costs.   Following Blundell and Robin we specify a 
                                                 
7 Note that it is also possible to generate indirect estimates of the competitive effect from the Q-AIDS 
system if one is willing to assume that the milk processors are engaged in a Bertrand competition game.  
Since part of the purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether or not there is any competition between 
labeled and unlabeled milk it would be counter productive to assume a specific type of competition.  
8 An alternative is the GMM framework developed by Banks, Blundell, and Lewbell. 
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reduced form expenditure equation where household expenditure in the l
th city at time t is 
a function of median household income and a time trend: 
(6) M lt = f(time trend, income).   
Given these reduced form specifications for the price and expenditure equations, we 
estimate jointly (2), (5) and (6) by FIML.  The resulting parameter estimates have 
desirable asymptotic properties (Amemiya). 
  To control for city specific variations, we modify the Q-AIDS specification with 
demographic translating variables (Z1lt, …, ZKlt).  Our AIDS model also incorporates a set 
of four seasonal dummy variables for each city along with socio-demographic variables.  
In order to maintain theoretical consistency of the AIDS model, the following restrictions 
are applied to demographic translating parameter α0i: 
(7)  α0i = ∑ =
4
1 r r irD d ,  1
4
1 = ∑ = r ir d , i = 1,…, N,  
where dir is the parameter for the i
th brand associated with the seasonal dummy variable 
Dr for the r




3.1 Empirical Specifications 
Price Specification 
Most recent studies of differentiated products have modeled price as a function of 
supply and demand shifters, assuming these shifters are exogenous to the price formation 
mechanism (e.g., Cotterill, Franklin and Ma; Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar; and Kadiyali, 
Vilcassim and Chintagunta).  For milk products, raw milk prices account for 62% of the 
retail milk price and thus can be used as a reasonable proxy for a large part of the 
variability in manufacturing costs.
9  Other important retailing and processing costs we 
include in the price formation equation provide proxies for labor, merchandising, and 
packaging costs.  We therefore specify the retail price functions, equation (5), with raw 
milk price, marketing and other product characteristics as explanatory variables: 
                                                 
9 Dairy Industry: Information on Milk Prices and Changing Market Structure. U.S. G.A.O Report, January  
2001.   13
(8)
[ ] ilt i ilt i ilt i lt i ilt i ilt i i ilt UPV PRD p wage p C p C p 6 5 1 4 3
2
2 1 0 ) ln( ) ln( ) _ ln( ) _ ln( ) ln( θ θ θ θ θ θ θ + + + + + + = −
  
where pilt is the retail price of milk type i, in city l and at time t.  As a measure of milk 
costs, C_plt is the price of announced cooperative class I milk price in city l at time t, 
including adjustments for the added costs of organic milk.  Similarly, wagelt is the wage 
rate in city l at time t and pilt-1 is the lagged retail price.
10  As a measure of the average 
size of purchases UPVilt is the unit volume of the i
th product in the l
th city at time t.  For 
example, if a consumer purchases only one gallon bottles of a brand, then unit volume for 
that brand will be just one.  Conversely, if this consumer buys a half-gallon bottle then 
the unit volume will be 2.  This variable is used to capture packaging-related cost 
variations, as smaller package size per volume implies higher costs to produce, distribute, 
and shelve.  The variable PRDilt is the percent price reduction of brand i and is used to 
capture any costs associated with specific price reductions such as aisle end displays or 
freestanding newspaper inserts.   
 
Expenditure Specification 
Similarly the reduced form expenditure function in (6) is specified as: 
(9)  lt lt lt t lt idx C wage x TR x _ ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 4 3 1 2 1 0 ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ + + + + = −  , 
where t = 1,…, 260 and ψ0 is the intercept term.  TRt is a linear trend, capturing any 
unobservable time specific effects on consumer milk expenditures.  The variable wagelt is 
the average wage rate in city l and is used as a proxy to capture the effect of income 
differences on milk purchases.  C_idxlt is the city level consumer price index; this 
variable captures any city level overall supply shocks to consumers.  
  In general the reduced form specifications, equations (8) and (9), are always 
identified, although the issue of parameter identification is rather complex in such non-
linear structural models.
11  We checked the order conditions for identification that would 
apply to a linearized version of the demand equations (2) and found them to be satisfied.  
                                                 
10 Note that processors pay the same price to farmers for rBST-free and unlabeled milk and this price is 
governed by the federal milk marketing order (FMMO).  On the other hand organic milk farmers tend to a 
premium price for their price and this price is not regulated by any federal authority. 
11 For a detailed discussion please refer to Mittelhammer, Judge and Miller (p.474-475).    14
Finally, we did not uncover numerical difficulties in implementing the FIML estimation.  
As pointed out by Mittelhammer, Judge and Miller (p.474-475) we interpret this as 




  Our translating specification (e.g. αilt = α0i+ ∑ =
K
1 k λik Zklt) has four quarterly 
dummies and two continuous variables.  These two variables are: the monthly wage rate 
in the city and the consumer price index.  The seasonal dummies will be able to capture 
any seasonal variations in a given city. The wage rate variable captures any impact of 
change in income on milk consumption. And lastly the consumer price index can capture 
any exogenous shocks in other markets on the consumption of milk. 
 
 
4. Q-AIDS Model Estimation Results 
Table 3 provides parameter estimates for the demand system, reduced form price and 
expenditure equations.  In total we estimate 45 parameters, of them 34 parameters are 
significant at a 5% level of significance.  Both of our estimated β parameters measuring 
how consumption of milk changes with expenditure are significant at a 5% level of 
significance.  Of the estimated τ parameters, which describe the quadratic term on 
expenditure, one of them is significant at the 5% level and the other one is significant the 
10% level.  The significance of parameters (τ) associated with the quadratic part of the 
demand system validates the choice of a Q-AIDS formulation for demand.   
 
4.1 Analysis of Elasticity Estimates:   
Table 4 presents expenditure elasticity estimates and associated standard errors while  
Tables 5(a) and 5(b) present uncompensated and compensated price elasticity estimates 
and associated standard errors.  We estimate elasticities at the mean of the variables and 
find that all of them to be significantly different from zero at a 5% level or less.  The un-
compensated price elasticities are not significantly different from the compensated ones.  
                                                 
12 Due to space limitations, we report only related econometric results. More complete reports of the results 
are available from the authors on request.    15
Since this implies that the overall impact of per capita expenditure on milk consumption 
is minimal, the analysis of price elasticities uses un-compensated price elasticities. 
All types of milk show, as expected by theory, negative uncompensated own-
price elasticities.  Of the own price effects rBST-free milk has the highest own price 
elasticities (-4.40) followed by organic milk (-1.37) and unlabeled milk has the lowest (-
1.04).  RBST-free and organic milk have negative cross price elastiticities, implying they 
are complements to each other.  In contrast the positive cross price elasticities between 
unlabeled and both rBST-free and organic milks implies that unlabeled milk is a 
substitute for both of them.  This substitution pattern is, however, asymmetric suggesting 
greater movement to organic and rBST-free milk than back to unlabeled milk.  For 
example, a 1% change in the price of unlabeled milk leads to a large switch from 
unlabeled to other milk: a 1.51% change in rBST-free milk demand and a 3.15% change 
in organic milk demand.  On the other hand, a 1% price change in rBST-free milk leads 
to only a 0.05% change in unlabeled demand, and 1% price change in organic milk leads 
to only a 0.02% change in demand for unlabeled milk.  This implies that once consumers 
switch to higher priced products (i.e. rBST-free and organic) they usually do not switch 
back to unlabeled milk even for significant price changes.  Such stickiness in consumer 
behavior may suggest that once consumers choose labeled milk they perceive a quality 
difference in comparison to unlabeled milk as would be the case in a vertically 
differentiated product market.
13  Consumers in vertically differentiated markets do not 
tend to switch back to a lower quality product once they switch to a higher quality 
product.
14 
Among the expenditure elasticities, rBST-free milk has the highest (4.39) and 
organic milk has the lowest (0.5) elasticity.  Unlabeled milk has, as expected, an 
expenditure elasticity just below unity suggesting a necessity.  The low expenditure 
elasticity for organic milk is perhaps surprising given that the organic milk is commonly 
perceived to be associated with higher income groups of the population.  And the 
relationship between income and milk expenditure may not be positively correlated. It is 
                                                 
13 Blind taste tests conducted informally by the authors could discern no quality differences in terms of 
taste between these three types of milk. 
14 A classic example of vertically differentiated market is computer chips market.  Once consumers switch 
to Pentium 4 chips they prefer not to switch back to Pentium 3 or lower quality chips.   16
commonly known that large families with children tend to have higher per capita 
expenditure on milk. In that case our result suggests that smaller families with no 
children tend to consume more of organic milk. In the case of rBST-free milk early work 
on rBST in milk by Grobe and Douthitt (1995) does suggest that risk perceptions of rBST 
are negatively correlated with income, which would be consistent with these results. 
Similar to the arguments made in the case of organic milk, it is probable that large 
families with children are interested in minimizing the risks associated with artificial 
hormones but not that much interested in other associated benefits of organic milk. 
Another possible explanation is that we are only estimating a partial demand system and 
we have not fully accounted for cross expenditure effects. 
 
4.2 Estimating Consumer Willingness to Pay 
As demonstrated above, consumer willingness to pay for labeled milks can be 
estimated by the compensating variation.  This compensating variation has two elements 
a competitive effect and a variety effect.  The estimation procedure and results for each of 
these elements are described below. 
 
4.2.1 Competitive Effects: 
The strategy for identifying the competitive effects of specialty milks is to 
compare prices in markets and times in which they are sold with those where and when 
they are not offered for sale.   The data set includes one city where no rBST-free milk 
was sold, 6 cities that experienced an introduction of organic milk, and 7 cities that 
experienced an rBST-free milk introduction.  This provides a way to value consumer 
surplus from rBST-free and organic milk by observing the effects of their introduction on 
prices of unlabeled milk, which is the competition effect (CE).  If the introduction of 
these specialty milks reduces the price of unlabeled milk, then consumers benefit from 
the competition even if they do not purchase the specialty milk.  This competition effect 
would be over and above the benefit, utility, gained by those who consume specialty milk 
described by the variety effect. 
Following Hausman and Leonard let the pricing equation for unlabeled (non-
specialty) milk be described in the following manner:   17
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The dependent variable is the price of milk in city i during week t. The time specific 
effects in the market are captured by the 0-1 indicator variable Wi. In order to account for 
fixed effects in each market, the error structure is assumed to include a city specific effect 
νit and a mean zero error term µit. The indicators Iit capture the effects of an introduction 
of specialty milks, equaling 1 if it is present in the market and zero otherwise.  Thus, the 
coefficient δ1 represents the competitive effect (CE), the change in price with the 
introduction of labeled milk having controlled for city and time specific effects.   The 
variable Bit represents the number of brands in a city during a particular week in order to 
control for the general effects of brand introduction in the estimation. 
The equation is estimated using weekly prices per gallon averaged across brands 
of unlabeled milk in each of 12 cities as the dependent variable.  Results for the key 
parameters of interest are presented in Table 6. The estimated competition effect is strong 
with milk prices shown to be decreasing in the total number of brands, as well as the 
introduction of organic and rBST-free brands.  More importantly, the introduction of 
organic milk or rBST-free milk has an effect of decreasing the price 6 or 7 times lower 
than the entry of another unlabeled milk brand. This price reduction due to the 
competitive effect of organic and rBST-free milk combined reduce the price almost 2 
cents per gallon.  While 2 cents represents less than 1% of the average price paid, when 
these numbers are aggregated to a national figure they imply a net competitive effect of 
specialty milk of about $2.5 million per week or $130 million per year.  This represents 
the benefit consumers of unlabeled milk receive from the existence of labeled/specialty 
milk in the market, even though they do not purchase it.   
 
4.2.2 Variety effect:   
As mentioned above we use our demand system parameter estimates to measure variety 
effects for the introduction of rBST-free and organic milk.  Table 7 presents estimates of 
the virtual prices, which are the prices at which quantity purchased would be driven to 
zero, and the variety effects consumers receive from having rBST-free and organic   18
labeled milk in the market.  We estimate the virtual price of a milk type by solving our 
estimated Q-AIDS setting the budget share of the milk type to zero.   
The virtual prices show some important differences between how rBST-free milk 
and organic milk are priced in the market.  RBST-free milk has a much lower virtual 
price and is priced on average and in most markets within $1.50 of its virtual price.  This 
implies that rBST-free brands have relatively little pricing power and that raising rBST-
free milk to the price of organic would result in near zero sales.  On the other hand the 
lower estimated price elasticities for organic milk imply much higher virtual prices and 
significant scope for price increases in the absence of competition.   These differences 
also suggest that most of the consumer benefits from labeled milk come from organic 
milk rather than from rBST-free milk.  
From the virtual prices and the estimated demand surface curvatures one can 
calculate the average variety effect, which, averaged across the four cities, is 17 cents per 
capita per gallon per week.  This implies a representative consumer across these four 
cities receives 17 cents worth of benefit per week just for the option of having rBST-free 
and organic milk in his/her choice set.  There are, however, significant variations at the 
city level.  The highest per capita variety effect is in a western city, WT_4, (27 cents per 
week), and the lowest is in a southern city, SO_1, (12 cents per week).  The ranking of 
these benefits between these cities does not match with the ranking of median household 
income of the cities, suggesting the common perception that organic and rBST-free milk 
consumption is positively associated with income may not be correct.   
Based on an estimated per capita yearly benefit of $8.84 per person the total 
variety effect benefit to all 26 million consumers in the four cities combined is $234 
million per year.  When aggregated to the national level, the variety effect equals $2.53 
billion per year in consumer benefits from having rBST-free and organic milk in the 
market.  This variety effect dwarfs the estimated competitive effect and is more than five 
times the estimated expenditure of U.S. consumers on organic milk. 
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implications: 
This work has investigated consumer willingness to pay for rBST-free and 
organic milk using retail price differentials and a quadratic version of the almost ideal 
demand system in a revealed preference analysis.  In contrast to most of the literature, 
these estimates take into account changes in consumer behavior over time and the price 
effects of competition between processors.  This work finds consumers pay significantly 
more for rBST-free and organic milk but also derive significantly large benefits from 
having them both in the market.  The results show that nationally consumers benefit both 
from the competition induced by labeled milk and by the benefits of an increased choice 
set.  In addition this work has identified much greater consumer benefits to organic milk 
than rBST-free milk, which is like organic but may contain pesticides and antibiotics.   
  These results shed some light on USDA labeling policy options for organic and 
GMO-free goods.  It seems clear that consumers derive significant benefits from being 
able to buy organic milk and rBST-free milk and to the extent a national organic standard 
is necessary the benefits are quite large.  One should note that a less stringent standard 
would have very little benefit to consumers. This presents a cautionary tale to policy 
makers considering creating organic standards with low thresholds: these efforts to create 
weak labels may not be worth the consumer benefits. 
  A number of productive avenues for future research remain for investigation.  The 
surprising result that higher per capita expenditure is not associated with higher organic 
milk purchases deserves particular attention.  It is possible that organic purchases are 
being driven by ideology or risk preferences as much as income and future research 
might benefit from controlling for those effects.  Finally it is clear that the market for 
labeled milk has significant scope for non-competitive behaviors which is a direction we 
plan to investigate in the future.   20
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Table 1: Average Milk Price and Market Share by City 
 Price  Market  Share 
City 
Code Organic   
rBST 
Free Unlabeled    Organic   rBST Free  Unlabeled 
MW_1 6.44  5.32  2.82    0.3735 0.4137 99.2127 
MW_2 6.23  6.15  2.51    0.2345 0.0005 99.7650 
MW_3  5.86           .   2.68    0.2466 - 99.7534 
NE_1 5.57 4.28  2.80    0.8742 0.1845 98.9413 
SO_1 5.93 4.92  3.06    0.2343 0.4134 99.3523 
SO_2 6.43 5.92  3.02    0.0851 0.0044 99.9105 
SO_3 5.74 6.01  2.44    0.4347 0.2927 99.2726 
SO_4 5.70 5.30  3.16    0.2891 0.1882 99.5227 
WT_1 6.02 4.56  3.10    0.8612 1.1344 98.0044 
WT_2 5.98 4.22  2.58    0.1293 0.0019 99.8688 
WT_3 5.85 4.80  2.38    0.0809 0.0048 99.9143 
WT_4 5.28 3.69  3.01    1.0956 2.6918 96.2125 
Average 5.91  4.85  2.80  0.4116  0.4846  99.1442 
 
Table 2: Average Milk Price and Market Share by Year 
 Price  Market  Share 
Year Organic 
rBST 
Free Unlabeled   Organic rBST  Free Unlabeled 
1997  5.26 3.97  2.57  0.1199 0.3042  99.6012 
1998  5.50 4.38  2.69  0.2310 0.6051  99.2143 
1999  5.72 4.76  2.84  0.3620 0.5649  99.1201 
2000  6.06 4.97  2.85  0.5420 0.5019  98.9980 
2001  6.55 5.53  2.97  0.6901 0.4208  98.9241 
2002  6.82 5.81  2.95  0.8009 0.4482  98.7882 
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Table 3: Regression Results 
Parameters Estimates  t-stat 
Q-AIDS Parameters    
Quarterly Binary 1 in rBST Milk  0.17  4.39 
Quarterly Binary 2 in rBST Milk  0.17  4.41 
Quarterly Binary 3 in rBST Milk  0.18  4.43 
Quarterly Binary 4 in rBST Milk  0.17  4.40 
Quarterly Binary 1 in Organic Milk  0.00  -0.46 
Quarterly Binary 2 in Organic Milk  -0.02  -1.62 
Quarterly Binary 3 in Organic Milk  -0.26  -18.29 
Quarterly Binary 4 in Organic Milk  -0.26  -18.35 
Wage in rBST Milk  -0.26  -18.33 
CPI in rBST Milk  -0.26  -18.28 
Wage in Organic Milk  -0.02  -12.49 
CPI in Organic Milk  0.07  19.88 
β in rBST Milk  0.07 4.02 
β in Organic Milk  -0.02 -3.90 
τ in rBST Milk  0.02 1.95 
τ in Organic Milk  -0.01  -3.35 
Γ11 -0.03  -9.50 
Γ12 -0.02  -13.33 
Γ22 0.00  -1.66 
Price Equations     
Intercept: rBST Milk  -0.25  -3.90 
Intercept: Organic Milk  -0.21  -3.40 
Intercept: Unlabeled Milk  -0.48  -4.94 
Coop Milk Price: rBST-free milk  0.04  0.67 
Coop Milk Price: Organic milk  0.12  1.79 
Coop Milk Price: Unlabeled milk  -0.06  -0.98 
Wage Rate: rBST-free Milk  0.12  6.84 
Wage Rate: Organic Milk  0.03  3.43 
Wage Rate: Unlabeled Milk  0.14  7.44 
1 period lagged Price: rBST-free Milk  0.74  39.75 
1 period lagged Price: Organic Milk  0.88  72.38 
1 period lagged Price: Unlabeled Milk  0.83  44.38 
Percentage Price Reduction: rBST-free milk  -0.01  -6.65 
Percentage Price Reduction: Organic milk  -0.01  -8.97 
Percentage Price Reduction: Unlabeled milk  -0.01  -9.92 
Unit per volume: rBST-free milk  0.05  9.71 
Unit per volume: Organic milk  0.12  4.43 
Unit per volume:  Unlabeled milk  0.08  3.32 
Coop Milk Price
2: rBST-free milk  0.06  0.77 
Coop Milk Price
2: Organic milk  -0.07  -1.44 
Coop Milk Price
2: Unlabeled milk  0.08  0.92 
Expenditure Function     
Intercept -0.28  -1.08 
Time trend  0.01  10.18 
1 period lagged expenditure  0.75  37.23 
wage rate  0.28  9.46 
CPI -0.18  -3.12   24
Table 4: Expenditure Elasticities 
Products    Estimates  
rBST Free   4.39 
    14.19 
Organic   0.50 
    5.01 
Unlabeled   0.97 
    266.65 
 
Table 5a: Price Elasticities (Un-Compensated)              Table 5b: Price Elasticities (Compensated) 
Products rBST  Free  Organic  Unlabeled 
rBST Free  -4.40 -1.66 1.51 
  -12.81 -12.88 2.76 
Organic  -2.51 -1.37 3.15 
  -9.97 -6.36  12.36 
Unlabeled  0.05 0.02  -1.04 
  12.66 12.61  -152.93 
 
Table 6: Reduced Form Price Model - 
Fixed Effects  
Dependent variable: 
Price of unlabeled milk  Estimates  t-stat 
Organic brand introduction  -0.01  -4.65 
rBST-free brand introduction  -0.01  -5.62 
Total number of brands in market  -0.0012  -8.49 
Constant 0.36  48.03 
N=3120, number of groups=12 
R-square:  within = 0.457; between = 0.097; overall = 0.104 
Note: Equation includes 259 weekly dummy variables 
 
Products rBST  Free  Organic  Unlabeled 
rBST Free  -4.40 -1.66 1.55 
  -12.80 -12.88 2.84 
Organic  -2.51 -1.37 3.15 
  -9.97 -6.36  12.37 
Unlabeled  0.05 0.02  -1.08 
 12.54  12.44  -226.29   25
 
Table 7: Virtual Price and Variety Effects 
 Indirect  Utility  rBST  Free  Organic  Variety Effect  City Population 
  City   VP MP VP MP       
Total Benfit from 
Variety Effect 
SO_1  0.417 5.78  4.92  35.09  5.93 0.12  3,433,400    405,230 
   0.000 0.001    0.003    0.001       
NE_1   0.332 4.45  4.28  89.34  5.57 0.16  5,091,700    824,409 
   0.000 0.001    0.005    0.001       
WT_1  0.410 5.85  4.56  55.70  6.02 0.13  15,116,700    2,040,496 
   0.000 0.001    0.004    0.001       
WT_4  0.505 7.56  3.69  382.62  5.28 0.27  2,846,800    781,881 
    0.000 0.003    0.007    0.003      
All Four Cities  0.417 5.82  4.36  93.97  5.70 0.17  26,488,600    4,544,434 
   0.000 0.001    0.005    0.001      
*Total Benefit is estimated on a per week basis 
*VP: Virtual Price; MP: Existing Mean Price in the market 






















Figure 1: Weekly Market Share for the four cities 
 




















Figure 2: Non-parametric Engel curve: organic milk in WT_4  27




















Figure 3: Non-parametric Engel curve: rBST-free milk in WT_4 
 




















Figure 4: Non-parametric Engel curve: Unlabeled milk in WT_4 